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Different Strokes for Different Folks: Balancing the 
Treatment of Employers and Employees in Employment 
Discrimination Cases in Courts within the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Equal Pay Act of 1963 ("EPA"), 1 Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 2 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
("ADEA'')/ and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA")4 are legis-
lative attempts to eradicate employment discrimination in the United 
States. Following the passage of these acts, both state and federal courts 
have developed substantial case law regarding the time requirements for 
filing employment discrimination cases and the minimum number of 
employees an employer must have to be covered under the above listed 
acts. 
With regard to time limitations, each act has specific times by which 
complainants must file a charge or lose their claim. The U.S. Supreme 
Court has held that where an act requires filing with an appropriate ad-
ministrative agency before commencing civil suit, timely filing with the 
agency is not a jurisdictional prerequisite, but the time limitations are 
subject to tolling under equitable principles of law.5 With regard to equi-
table tolling of time limitations, state and federal courts have varied as to 
which circumstances will persuade them to toll the time limitations. 
Some courts have interpreted the requirements for equitable tolling 
broadly, allowing more pro-employee holdings.6 Other courts have been 
* Copyright © 2002 Ruben H. Arredondo. This comment is dedicated to my little family-
Alicia and Simon. 
I. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1963). 
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1991 ). 
3. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1967). 
4. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1990). 
5. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982). 
6. See Cantrell v. Knoxville Cmty. Dev. Corp., 60 F.3d 1177 (6th Cir. 1995); Oshiver v. 
Levin, 38 F.3d 1380 (3rd Cir. 1994); Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir. 1983); Hornick 
v. Borough of Duryea, 507 F. Supp. 1091 (M.D. Pa. 1980); Bethel v. Jefferson, 589 F.2d 631 (D.C. 
Cir. 1978); Burton v. United States Postal Serv., 612 F. Supp. 1057 (N.D. Ohio 1985). 
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more strict when dealing with equitable considerations regarding time 
limitations, or more employer friendly. 7 
Courts have varied in how broadly they define the term "employee" 
in deciding whether an employer has the minimum number of employees 
to be covered by the act under which the discrimination claim is brought. 
Some have strictly interpreted the term "employee." Other courts have 
construed the term "employee" more broadly, often including all persons 
over which the employer has control. 
A survey of case law emanating from courts within the Tenth Circuit 
reveals that several courts, at both the state and federal level, are pre-
dictably employer friendly in employment discrimination suits. This 
Note argues for a more evenhanded approach by courts within the Tenth 
Circuit toward employees. 
Part II briefly describes the EPA, Title VII, the ADEA, and the 
ADA, and explains the charge filing process. Part III gives the facts, pro-
cedural background, and holdings of three cases within the Tenth Circuit. 
Two are federal cases dealing with equitable tolling of time limitations in 
cases where claimants have been assisted by an attorney and where em-
ployer actions have been blamed for a claimants' failure to make a timely 
filing. The third, a Utah Supreme Court case, deals with the small em-
ployer exemption in state anti-discrimination acts. Analysis of this case 
will focus primarily on the dissent's opinion. Part IV argues for broader 
interpretations of the applicable act in each case. Specifically, it argues 
that the broader interpretation of filing requirements used within other 
circuits is the more evenhanded approach, especially given the realities 
faced by claimants in employment discrimination suits and the remedial 
nature of anti-discrimination laws. 
II. A DESCRIPTION OF FEDERAL ANTI-DISCRIMINATION ACTS 
This Note deals with four federal anti-discrimination acts: the EPA, 
Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA. A basic understanding of those acts 
is necessary to understand the analysis of the courts and this Note. This 
part gives a brief description of each statute listing the categories each 
protects. It also describes the method for processing charges of discrimi-
nation. 
7. See Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1256 (lOth Cir. 1976); Davis v. Wesley Ret. Cmty. 
Inc., 913 F. Supp. 1437 (D. Kan. 1995); Biester v. Midwest Health Servs. Inc., 1994 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 14350 (D. Kan. Sept. 26, 1994); Peterson v. Wichita, 706 F. Supp. 766 (D. Kan. 1989); Jones 
v. Hodell, 711 F. Supp. 1048 (D. Utah 1989); Burton v. Exam Ctr. Indus. & Gen. Med. Clinic. Inc., 
994 P.2d 1261 (Utah 2000). 
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A. The Acts 
1. The Equal Pay Act of 1963 
The EPA, passed in 1963, established the minimum wage and pro-
hibited gender-based wage discrimination. It states in part: "No employer 
having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall dis-
criminate ... between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to 
employees ... at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to em-
ployees of the opposite sex ... for equal work ... under similar working 
conditions .... "8 
2. Title VJJ of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
Title VII was a legislative enactment that came partly in response to 
the civil rights movement of the 1960s. Title VII created the primary 
federal agency responsible for enforcement of the anti-discrimination 
acts, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). Title 
VII made it an "unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to 
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate ... with respect to [employment], because of such individual's 
race, color, religion, sex or national origin."9 Title VII defines an "em-
ployer" as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 
fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or 
more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year."10 An 
"employee" is defined as "an individual employed by an employer." 11 
3. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
In 196 7, Congress passed the AD EA to protect workers forty years 
of age and older. 12 The ADEA sought to protect older workers from dis-
crimination based on age in both the hiring and retention process. 13 The 
ADEA applies to employers with at least twenty employees. 14 Currently, 
there are no federal statutes protecting workers less than forty years of 
age from age discrimination. 
8. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(l) (1963). 
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)( I) (1990). 
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)(l990). 
II. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) ( 1990). 
12. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1967). 
13. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1967). 
14. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1967). 
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4. The Americans with Disabilities Act 
The ADA, passed in 1990, sought to eliminate "discrimination 
against individuals with disabilities." 15 It specifically prohibits discrimi-
nation against a qualified individual with a disability. 16 A qualified indi-
vidual is defined as "an individual with a disability who, with or without 
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the 
employment position that such individual holds or desires."17 The ADA 
defines a disability as "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substan-
tially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; 
(B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such 
an impairment."18 The ADA applies to employers who have fifteen or 
more employees. 19 
B. Filing a Charge of Discrimination 
There are time limitations for filing discrimination claims under the 
EPA, Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA. Parties filing under the EPA 
need not file a claim with the EEOC before commencing a private action 
in court?0 If a person feels they have been the target of employer dis-
crimination and decides to file a charge under Title VII, the ADA, or the 
ADEA, she must first file a charge with the EEOC in order to preserve 
her right to a civil suit. 21 The time limitation for filing a claim with the 
EEOC is 180 days from the time "the alleged unlawful discriminatory 
practice occurred. "22 However, in deferral states, or in states where the 
"EEOC defers to the enforcement efforts of a state agency empowered to 
undertake employment discrimination investigations," the filing date is 
three hundred days.23 
The purpose of the time limitation is threefold: ( 1) to give notice to 
the employer that such a charge has been made24, (2) to allow the receiv-
ing agency an opportunity to reconcile the parties through mediation, 25 
and (3) to prevent the filing of stale claims, where material witnesses, 
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1210l(b)(l) (1990). 
16. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1990) 
17. 42 u.s.c. § 12112(8) (1990). 
18. 42 U .S.C. § 121 02(2) (1990). 
19. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (1990). 
20. See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Filing a Charge, at 
http://www.eeoc.gov /facts/howtofil.html (June 10, 1997). 
21. See id. 
22. Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc., 186 F.3d 1301, 1310 n.2 (lOth Cir. 1999) (citing 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1990)). 
23. !d. at n.2. 
24. See Cantrell, 60 F .3d at 1182. 
25. See Dartt, 539 F.2d at 1261. 
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and documents are no longer available.26 In most deferral states, the anti-
discrimination acts are based substantially on federal statutes. In em-
ployment discrimination cases brought before the Tenth Circuit under 
Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA, filing a charge with the appropriate 
state or federal agency, or both, is a prerequisite to commencing a civil 
suit under either state or federal statutes.27 
Upon receipt of the charge, the reviewing agency has time to assess 
and decide whether to pursue the claim on behalf of the charging party or 
find that there is no basis for the charge and terminate the investigation?8 
A state agency may forward the claim to the respective EEOC regional 
office?9 If the EEOC believes the claim is valid, the EEOC may pursue 
relief on behalf of the charging party, pursuing mediation between the 
employer and the employee.30 If within the time allotted, the EEOC finds 
that conciliation with the employer is not possible, then the EEOC must 
notify the charging party that conciliation efforts have failed and that the 
charging party has the right to file a civil claim within 90 days of receipt 
of the notice. 31 The notice advising the charging party of her right to sue 
is called the "right-to-sue" or "notice-to-sue" letter.32 In McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green,33 the Supreme Court held that a claimant must 
receive the right-to-sue letter before filing a claim in court. However, 
several courts have held that where the charging party subsequently re-
ceives the right-to-sue letter after having filed a claim, but before trial, 
the subsequent receipt cures the defect. 34 Also, the Supreme Court has 
held that "filing a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a 
jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court, but a requirement that, 
like a statue of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel and equitable 
tolling. "35 
26. See id. 
27. See id. at 13 I 0. 
28. See 42 U .S.C. § 2000e-5( e)( I 990). 
29. See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Filing a Charge, (June I 0, I 997) at 
http://www.eeoc.gov /facts/howtofil.html . 
30. See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Facts about Mediation, (Feb. I I, 
I 999) at http://www.eeoc.gov/mediate/facts.html . 
3 I. 42 U .S.C. § 2000e-5(t)( I) (I 990). 
32. Jd; see also McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 41 I U.S. 792,798 (1973). 
33. 4 I I U.S. 792 (I 973). 
34. See Wrighten v. Metropolitan Hosps., Inc., 726 F.2d 1346 (9th Cir. 1989); Pinkard v. 
Pullman-Standard, 678 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1982); Henderson v. Eastern Freight Ways, Inc., 460 
F .2d 258 (4th Cir. I 972). 
35. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (I 982). 
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III. THREE CASES: BrESTER, DAVIS, AND EXAM CENTER 
This part gives the factual and procedural background of three cases 
within the Tenth Circuit. Two federal cases, Biester v. Midwest Health 
Services36 and Davis v. Wesley Retirement Community,37 deal with equi-
table tolling of time limitations in cases where a claimant has been as-
sisted by an attorney and where employer actions have been blamed for a 
claimant's failure to timely file, respectively. Burton v. Exam Center In-
dustrial & Medical Clinic, 38 a Utah Supreme Court case, deals with the 
minimum number of employees an employer must have to be covered 
under the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act.39 This Note deals primarily with 
the dissent's opinion in Exam Center. 
A. Biester v. Midwest Health Services, Inc. 
1. Factual background 
Steven W. Biester was an employee of Midwest Health Services, Inc. 
("Midwest") from December 1992 through May of 1993.40 While em-
ployed, he claims that he was sexually harassed by his supervising nurse 
from January through March.41 Residing in a deferral state, Biester filed 
first with the Kansas Commission on Human Rights ("KCHR"), which 
then forwarded his claim to the regional EEOC office.42 Subsequently, 
Biester requested that the EEOC issue him a right-to-sue letter.43 Around 
the same time, Biester's attorney requested that the EEOC send him the 
right-to-sue letter on behalf of Biester.44 Because of a clerical error on 
the part of the EEOC, a letter was sent only to Biester.45 The letter in-
formed Biester that he was required to file a claim within ninety days of 
receipt of the right-to-sue. 46 
Though Biester was notified of the letter by the postal service, he 
could not remember when he picked up the letter.47 Biester informed his 
attorney that he picked up the letter on October 30, 1993, but postal ser-
36. 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14350 (D. Kan. Sept. 26, 1994). 
37. 913 F. Supp. 1437 (D. Kan. 1995). 
38. 994 P.2d 1261 (Utah 2000). 
39. UTAH CODE ANN.§ 34A-5-101 (1994). 
40. Biester, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14350, at *4. 
41. !d. at *4. 
42. !d. 
43. !d. 
44. !d. 
45. !d. 
46. !d. at *5. 
47. !d. 
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vice records showed the letter was picked up on October 22, 1993. Bi-
ester was later hospitalized three times for major depression between 
April and May of the next year and continued outpatient treatment until 
December ofthat year.48 
2. Procedural history 
Biester filed a Title VII claim of sexual harassment against Midwest 
on January 26, 1994 in the United States District Court for the District of 
Kansas. 49 Midwest sought dismissal of the claim for failure to timely file 
a charge of discrimination. 50 Midwest argued that the right-to-sue letter 
was picked up October 22, 1993 and that Biester' s filing was untimely, 
having been filed ninety-five days after his receipt of the right-to-sue let-
ter.51 Biester argued that the letter was received on October 30, 1993, and 
thus the filing was timely. 52 The court treated Midwest's motion as a mo-
tion for summary judgment.53 
3. The holding 
The District Court held that Midwest offered undisputed evidence 
that Biester received his notice on October 22.54 After reviewing the par-
ties' motions and the standards for summary judgment, the court ana-
lyzed whether equitable principles allowed Biester's claims to go for-
ward.55 Biester argued that the ninety-day time limitation should be 
tolled because of his mental incapacity at the time he received the right-
to-sue letter and because of the EEOC's failure to send the letter to his 
attomey.56 
The court recognized that courts in general have narrowly defined 
exceptions to time limitations for filing employment discrimination 
claims.57 It restated the Tenth Circuit's position on the tolling of time 
limitations, saying that they would be tolled in limited circumstances 
where the plaintiff had been "lulled into inaction," "actively misled," or 
"in some extraordinary way been prevented from asserting his or her 
48. I d. 
49. Jd. at *1-2. 
50. I d. at* I. 
51. Jd. at *2. 
52. ld. at *5. 
53. Jd. at *7. 
54. !d. 
55. !d. at *8. 
56. I d. 
57. !d. at *9. 
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rights."58 The court then addressed Hiester's claims of mental incapacity, 
reviewing the holdings of other courts that had tolled the time limitation 
due to the claimant's mental incapacity.59 The court recognized that time 
limitations could be tolled in some circumstances due to mental incapac-
ity, but held that Hiester's circumstances did not warrant tolling of the 
time limitation.60 
In reviewing Hiester's circumstances, the courts focused on Hiester's 
representation by counsel rather than his mental incapacity during the 
ninety-day filing period.61 The court stated that the attorney had time to 
file, knew ofBiester's receipt of the right-to-sue letter, and relied only on 
Hiester's testimony of when the letter was received.62 The court stated 
that other courts had also refused to toll the time limitations "based on 
mental incapacity when a plaintiff is represented by counsel during the 
limitations period."63 Accordingly, the court dismissed Hiester's com-
plaint for sexual harassment, granting summary judgment to Midwest. 64 
B. Davis v. Wesley Retirement Communities, Inc. 
1. Thefacts 
Joyce Davis was an employee of Wesley Retirement Communities 
("Wesley").65 On June 3, 1992, Wesley accused her of abusing a retire-
ment facility resident. 66 The charge was reported to the Kansas Depart-
ment of Health and Environment ("KDHE"), which subsequently insti-
tuted an investigation.67 Davis's supervisor and Wesley's administrator, 
Mary Stuart, subsequently suspended Davis pending the investigation.68 
Soon after the investigation, Davis was fired on June 18, 1992 for the al-
leged abuse of a resident.69 Davis appealed to the KDHE and another 
hearing was held on February 18, 1993.70 During that hearing Stuart tes-
58. !d. at *II (quoting Martinez v. Orr, 738 F.2d 1107, 1110 (lOth Cir. 1984)). 
59. !d. at* I 0-13. 
60. /d.at*l3. 
61. !d. 
62. !d. at *13-14. 
63. !d. at *14 (citing Lopez v. Citibank, N.A., 808 F.2d 905,907 (lst Cir. 1987); Moody v. 
Bayliner Marine Corp., 664 F. Supp. 232, 236 (E.D. N.C. 1987)). 
64. /d. at *19. 
65. Davis 913 F. Supp. at 1441. 
66. !d. 
67. !d. 
68. !d. 
69. !d. 
70. Jd. 
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tified before a KDHE attomey. 71 Stuart was questioned about Davis's re-
lation to a group of black facility workers. 72 Stuart affirmed that they 
"hung out together" and "would stick up for each other"73 because they 
"[were] all black."74 Stuart further stated that "these gals come from 
lower middle class" and "[ e ]ven some of our very best aides who were 
black stuck up for each other no matter what, even when they knew that 
that person was wrong."75 She also believed the black facility workers 
"would lie to protect their friends."76 
Soon after the appeal of February 18, KDHE's presiding officer filed 
a report in which he noted inconsistent and contradictory evidence relat-
ing to abuse and also recognized that the accuser had a record of fabricat-
ing claims of abuse. 77 Additionally, he identified a history of animus be-
tween Davis and Stuart as well as a history of racial bias by the facility 
administration. 78 
2. Procedural history and holding 
Asserting that she did not know that she might have been terminated 
for racial reasons, Davis filed her first complaint of racial discrimination 
with the Kansas Human Rights Commission ("KHRC") and the EEOC in 
April 1993.79 They both denied her complaint as being untimely.80 The 
KHRC, however, reversed its decision and accepted a complaint from 
Davis. 81 Davis requested a right-to-sue letter and after its receipt, filed a 
civil suit on September 2, 1993 in the United States District Court for the 
District of Kansas. 82 
Wesley moved for summary judgment on Davis's Title VII claim al-
leging that Davis's suit was untimely filed. 83 Davis did not dispute that 
she filed after the three hundred day time limitation. However, she ar-
gued that the "300 day limitation for filing her complaint with the KHRC 
71. /d. 
72. /d. 
73. !d. 
74. /d. 
75. /d. 
76. /d. 
77. /d. at 1442. 
78. !d. 
79. /d. 
80. /d. 
81. /d. 
82. /d. 
83. /d. at 1440. 
270 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume XVI 
or the EEOC was tolled until [Davis] knew, or should have known, that 
the reasons for her termination were racially motivated."x4 
The court held that the time limitation was not tolled from the time 
she knew or should have known that the reason for her termination might 
have been racially motivated, but from the time the adverse action oc-
curred. 85 In issuing its ruling, the Court cited another Tenth Circuit Court 
case, Hulsey v. Kmart, 86 for its proposition that the three hundred day 
time limitation would have little meaning if the employer were equitably 
estopped whenever it "did not disclose a violation of [Title VII]."x7 The 
court held that the employee had a duty to ascertain whether there was an 
unlawful reason for the employment action "[r]egardless of the reasons 
advanced by the employer for the employment decision. The mere fact 
that the employer gave a non-discriminatory reason for her termination 
does not constitute 'active deception. "'88 The court consequently granted 
Wesley's Motion for Summary Judgment on Davis's Title VII claims.89 
C. Burton v. Exam Center Industrial 
1. Thefacts 
Hubert Burton, M.D. was a sixty-nine year old, part-time physician 
with Exam Center Industrial & General Medical Clinic, Inc. ("Exam 
Center").90 In July of 1994, Exam Center president, Howard Boulter, 
terminated Burton.91 Boulter told Burton that the Exam Center had hired 
a younger, full-time physician out of necessity and Boulter did not 
"know how much longer [Burton as an] older guy[] wanted to work.'m 
Burton later filed a charge against the Exam Center with the Utah Anti-
Discrimination Division ("UADD") alleging age discrimination.93 The 
UADD stated that since the Exam Center had less than fifteen employ-
ees,94 it was not covered under the jurisdiction of the UADD nor the 
Utah Anti-Discrimination Act ("UADA"). 95 
84. Jd. at 1442. 
85. !d. at 1443. 
86. 43 F.3d 555,557 (lOth Cir. 1994). 
87. Davis, 913 F. Supp. at 1442-43. 
88. I d. at 1443. 
89. Jd. at 1445. 
90. Exam Center, 994 P.2d at 1262. 
91. Jd. 
92. Jd. at 1262. 
93. I d. at 1262-63. 
94. Under the ADEA, an employer must have twenty employees. See 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) 
(1967). 
95. Exam Center, 994 P.2d at 1262-63. 
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2. Procedural history 
Burton then filed a claim in trial court alleging that both state and 
federal acts support a public policy prohibiting age discrimination and 
that such public policy gave rise to the tort of wrongful termination. 96 
The trial court initially denied the Exam Center's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, but later granted it upon the Exam Center's Motion to Recon-
sider97 that cited law from the Utah case, Retherford v. AT&T Communi-
cations.98 Burton appealed the trial court's decision.99 
3. The holding 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Utah held that the UADA did not 
assert "a public policy which [was] 'clear and substantial' with respect to 
small employers"100 because the legislature exempted small employers 
from coverage under the UADA and any decision to expose small em-
ployers to liability for age discrimination was a legislative and not a judi-
cial matter. 101 The court stated that there were three central reasons for 
not allowing a common law claim for wrongful discharge. First, the court 
stated that federal and state laws prohibiting age discrimination had as 
their common goal "not so much to redress each discrete instance of in-
dividual discrimination," but the eradication of the "egregious and con-
tinued discriminatory practices of economically powerful organizations. 
Thus, they could afford to exempt the small employer."102 Second, the 
laws struck a balance between the desire to protect individual workers 
from discrimination and a desire to protect small businesses that would 
likely hire people of similar ethnicities, socioeconomic status, etc. 103 
Third, the court stated that to expose small employers to a tort claim for 
wrongful discharge would invoke the longer time limits of tort claims, 
involve costly legal fees, and expose small employers to excessive dam-
ages.104 The court, accordingly, affirmed the trial court's grant of Exam 
Center's Motion for Summary Judgment. 105 
96. !d. 
97. !d. 
98. 844 P.2d 949 (Utah 1992) (holding that the UADA provided the only remedy for the tor-
tious claim of discharge in violation of public policy). 
99. Exam Center, 994 P.2d at 1263. 
100. !d. at 1265. 
101. Id. at 1266. 
102. !d. at 1266-67 (quoting Jennings v. Maralle, 876 P.2d 1074, 1082 (Cal. 1994)). 
103. Exam Center, 994 P.2d at 1266-67. 
104. !d. at 1267. 
105. !d. 
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4. Justice Durham's dissent 
Justice Durham, with Justice Stewart concurring, argued that the ma-
jority's decision would open a loophole to the UADA, allowing small 
employers to discriminate not only based on age, but also on race, gen-
der, religion, and disability. 106 She provided three reasons in favor of the 
common law claim of wrongful discharge. First, Justice Durham argued 
that the Supreme Court of Utah had allowed public policy exceptions 
when they were "so substantial and fundamental that there can be virtu-
ally no question as to their importance for promotion of the public 
good."107 Justice Durham argued that the core policy of the UADA was 
that discrimination based on age, race, gender, and disability was not in 
the public good. 108 The fact that the legislature did not extend coverage 
to small employers did not reduce the importance of that core policy; the 
legislature clearly intended the UADA to have broad implications. 109 
Second, Justice Durham argued that because small businesses consti-
tuted almost seventy percent of Utah's employers, the UADA only ap-
plied to a small portion of Utah employers, recognizing a common law 
claim of wrongful discharge would address the other seventy percent of 
employers. 11° Finally, Justice Durham reasoned that the state had a le-
gitimate policy interest in regulating the workplace and prohibiting 
workplace discrimination. 111 Prohibiting small employers from discrimi-
nating would protect the public interest and protect future economic op-
portunities and growth for citizens. 112 
IV. ANALYSIS 
This section focuses on three areas where courts within the Tenth 
Circuit should interpret the various anti-discrimination statutes to provide 
a more balanced treatment of employees. First, it focuses on circum-
stances where claimants have been represented by counsel in employ-
ment discrimination cases. Second, it concentrates on circumstances 
where employer actions have been blamed for a plaintiffs failure to 
timely file. Finally, this analysis deals with the small business exemption 
in anti-discrimination acts. 
106. !d. at 1268. 
107. Jd. (quoting Berube v. Fashion Ctr., Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033,1042 (Utah 1989)). 
I 08. !d. at 1268. 
109. See id. 
110. !d. at 1269. 
111. Jd. 
112. See id. 
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A. Assistance of an Attorney 
The Biester court reflects a similar approach taken by other courts 
within the Tenth Circuit when considering whether to toll the time limi-
tations for plaintiffs who have been assisted by counsel. 1 13 In Peterson v. 
Wichita, Peterson, an African-American claimant, brought a charge of 
racial discrimination against the City of Wichita, Kansas. 114 Peterson had 
assistance of counsel at some points in the charge filing process. 115 Al-
though Peterson filed his claim after the time limitation ran, 116 he argued 
that he was entitled to equitable tolling because of misinformation and 
mishandling on the part of city employees, as well as his general igno-
rance regarding the filing process. 117 The court refused to toll the time 
limitation, charging Peterson with constructive notice of Title VII charge 
filing requirements. 118 In denying Peterson the tolling of time limitations, 
the court stated that where a party claims ignorance of the law and has 
been assisted by counsel, there is no basis for equitable tolling. 119 
In Dartt v. Shell Oil Company, 120 Anne M. Dartt sued the company 
partly for age discrimination. 121 The Dartt court found that Dartt's cir-
cumstances merited equitable tolling of the time limitations, even though 
she consulted an attorney on two occasions. 122 The court noted that Dartt 
promptly followed the advice of the attorneys she consulted and was thus 
not sleeping on her rights. 123 The court also observed that the purpose of 
the notice requirement inherent in the time limitations was to allow the 
administrative agencies responsible for the charge to attempt conciliation 
and to provide the employer with notice of the charge. 124 However, in 
dictum, the court suggested that it might be inappropriate to grant tolling 
113. Compare Peterson v. Wichita, 706 F. Supp. 766, rev'd on other grounds, 888 F.2d 1307 
(D. Kan. 1989) (holding that the court had charged a plaintiff with constructive notice of procedural 
requirements for filing his complaint with the EEOC and refused to toll time limitations where plain-
tiff was assisted by counsel) with Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1256, aff'd 434 U.S. 99, reh 'g de-
nied, 434 U.S. 1042 (lOth Cir. 1976) (stating, in dictum, that tolling would not be permitted where 
the attorney slept on clients rights or believed client had none). 
114. Peterson, 706 F. Supp. at 769. 
115. !d. at 769-70. 
116. !d. at 770. 
117. !d. at 773. 
118. !d. 
119. !d. ("Plaintiff is unable to claim ignorance of the law because of his consultation with 
legal counsel."). The Peterson court, however, did state that where the actions of the employer are 
blamed for delayed filing, the fact that a plaintiff retained legal counsel is not considered when de-
ciding whether to equitably toll time limitations. See id. at 773. 
120. 539 F.2d 1256 (lOth Cir. 1976). 
121. !d. at 1258. 
122. !d. at 1261-62. 
123. !d. 
124. !d. 
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of the time limitations, even when plaintiffs counsel "slept on his cli-
ent's rights or did not believe he had any under the statute."125 
The Biester, Peterson, and Dartt courts seem to reflect a bright-line 
rule that (1) refuses to toll the time limitations where attorney ineptitude 
is involved--even where the counsel sleeps on a client's rights, and (2) 
looks more closely at whether a plaintiff retained counsel in determining 
knowledge of filing requirements than at the actual knowledge and facts 
surrounding the plaintiffs charge filing process. 
Such a rigid rule within the Tenth Circuit does not properly allow for 
the considerations that should be viewed in light of the purpose of state 
and federal anti-discrimination laws. First, such a bright-line rule is not 
appropriate in "a statutory scheme in which laymen, unassisted by 
trained lawyers, initiate the process."126 Though there are some claimants 
that might be able to navigate the "web of procedural traps,"127 many will 
not know the requirements of filing a charge of discrimination. Those 
claimants that live in deferral states will not likely be aware that they 
must first file with the state agency before filing with the EEOC. Also, 
the state might have different requirements for investigation of charges, 
conciliation between the employer and employee, and varying remedies 
from the federal statutes. Procedural requirements and terms, like right-
to-sue and conciliation, will likely be foreign to many claimants. Many 
claimants may find the process too complicated to truly pursue a charge 
to its full extent. 
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Bethel v. Jeffer-
son128 recognized that the statutory path outlined by many remedial acts, 
such as Title VII, "leave[] much to be desired in clarity and precision" 129 
and are "greatly confusing even for lawyers and judges."130 In Bethel, 
two black police officers brought charges of racial and religious dis-
crimination against the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police De-
partment. 131 In tolling the time limitation, the Bethel court reasoned that 
an act dependent on laymen for initiation should not use strict procedural 
125. !d. at 1261 n.4 (quoting Edwards v. Kaiser Alum. & Chern. Sales, Inc., 515 F.2d 1195, 
2000 (5th Cir. 1975)). 
126. Love v. Pullman, 404 U.S. 522, 527 (1972); see also, Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 
u.s. 750 (1979). 
127. Bethel v. Jefferson, 589 F.2d 631, 640 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
128. !d. 
129. /d. at 637 (quoting Olson v. Rembrandt Printing Co., 511 F.2d 1228, 1232 (8th Cir. 1975) 
(en bane)). 
130. !d. at 641 (citing Egelston v. State Univ. Coli., 535 F.2d 752,754 (2d Cir. 1976) ("Title 
Vll is rife with procedural requirements which are sufficiently labyrinthine to baffle the most experi-
enced lawyer, yet its enforcement mechanisms are usually triggered by laymen.")). 
131. !d. at 635. 
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and technical requirements to foreclose possible relief. 132 Rather, it rea-
soned that a court, while observing closely the purpose of requirements 
under such remedial acts, should also look closely at the "broad humani-
tarian and remedial purposes" of federal employment discrimination leg-
islation. 133 The Bethel court stated that the fact that a party might have 
had assistance of counsel at any stage of the filing process "is of no rele-
vance, for the Act must be given a construction rendering its mechanisms 
workable in the hands of laymen generally." 134 
The fact that laymen are primarily responsible for initiation of the 
statutory process for enforcing discrimination laws is only one reason 
against a bright-line rule. Another reason is that a rigid rule does not al-
low for consideration of the circumstances of each case. A rule that 
would tend to deny relief to a party, holding them responsible for the ac-
tions of counsel, ignores the fact that not all attorneys are adequate. 
Some attorneys may be sleeping on a client's rights, others may not have 
the client's best interests at heart, and others are no more able to deal 
with the filing process than are their lay clients. 
Finally, a bright-line rule tends to miss the mark by focusing on the 
acts of the attorney when it should focus on the acts of the claimant and 
the intent of the statute. The Hiester court, though initially stating that it 
would focus on Biester's mental capacity, failed to thoroughly explain 
why his mental capacity was not enough to warrant tolling. 135 Its primary 
focus was on the presence of counsel throughout the process. 136 
Two Sixth Circuit cases, Burton v. United States Postal Service137 
and Cantrell v. Knoxville Community Development Corporation 138 deal 
with circumstances where the plaintiff was assisted by counsel and 
missed time limitations for claim filing. In Burton, a postal worker filed a 
claim of racial discrimination after being terminated. 139 EEOC require-
ments stated that the workers must file a written complaint after a dis-
criminatory employment act. 140 Burton filed his complaint fourteen days 
late and at trial was ordered to explain why he had not filed in timely 
132. IJ. nt 642. 
133. /J. 
134. ld at 642 n.6 7. 
135. See Beistcr v. Midwest Health Servs. Inc., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14350, at *13-14. 
136. See iJ. 
137. 612 F. Supp. 1057 (N.D. Ohio 1985). 
13X. 60 F.3d 1177 (6th Cir. 1995). 
139. Burton v. Exam Ctr. Indus. & Gen. Med. Clinic, Inc., 612 F. Supp. at 1058. 
140. ld at I 059. 
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fashion. 141 Burton stated that he was without counsel throughout the 
charge filing process "through no fault of his own."142 
On appeal, the court, in determining whether equitable tolling was 
appropriate, compared the Title VII time limitations to other statutory 
time limitations and declared that "the basic inquiry is whether congres-
sional purposes [were] effectuated by tolling the statute oflimitations."143 
Instead of finding that Burton was estopped from arguing that his failure 
to timely file was due to lack of knowledge of the time requirements be-
cause of assistance by counsel, the court looked at the circumstances of 
Burton's case. 144 The court found that the plaintiff had pursued his claims 
as diligently as possible given his knowledge. 145 The court also looked at 
the actions of his attorney. Specifically, the court found that the attorney 
failed his client by neglecting to contact his client after consulting with 
the EEOC, by neglecting to mail complaints in a timely manner, and by 
leaving town without notifying Burton.146 The court held that punishing 
an innocent client for the "irresponsibility of his counsel" would defeat 
the remedial purposes of legislation like Title VII and would not defeat 
legislative purposes embodied in time limitations. 147 
In Cantrell v. Knoxville Community Development Corporation, the 
court dealt with a plaintiff who filed a racial discrimination claim under 
Title VII. 148 The lower court held that the time limitations for Cantrell's 
timely filing were equitably tolled given the fact that his attorney was 
mentally incapacitated. 149 On appeal, the employer argued that equitable 
tolling of time limitations was never warranted where attorney negli-
gence was involved. 150 The court stated that Cantrell was not a normal 
case of attorney negligence. 151 The court declared that before resolving 
whether equitable tolling was appropriate, the case must be remanded to 
determine the attorney's mental state during the 180 day filing period as 
well as Cantrell's diligence in filing his claim without attorney assis-
tance. 152 The dissent went further, arguing that equitable tolling was 
clearly appropriate. 153 The dissent stated that Cantrell had attempted to 
141. !d. at 1058-59. 
142. !d. at 1059. 
143. !d. (quoting Jones v. Transohio Sav. Assoc., 747 F.2d 1037, 1040 (6th Cir. 1984)). 
144. !d. 
145. !d. 
146. !d. 
147. !d. at 1059. 
148. 60F.3d 1177,1179(6thCir.1995). 
149. !d. at 1179. 
150. !d. 
151. !d. at 1179-80. 
152. /d.at1180. 
153. !d. at 1181. 
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contact the attorney on several occasions asking about the claim. 154 In 
fact, the attorney had failed to file the claim and later was removed from 
active practice owing to his mental incapacity. 155 The dissent reasoned 
that because the employer had made no showing of prejudice by 
Cantrell's late filing, and Cantrell had acted in good faith and with due 
diligence in filing his claim, equitable tolling was clearly appropriate. 156 
The previous cases present a broader interpretation of the remedial 
purposes of anti-discrimination legislation and a realistic view of the 
charge filing process. Instead of holding to a hard and fast rule, as many 
courts within the Tenth Circuit do, courts should look to the circum-
stances surrounding a claimant's untimely filing instead of the presence 
of counsel at some point in the process. While recognizing the legislative 
intent embodied in time limitations, the courts should also look at the 
remedial purposes of anti-discrimination acts. Courts should focus on a 
plaintiff's diligence in pursuing his claim, any bad faith evidenced by the 
charging party, the complexity of the claim, and the process by which the 
plaintiff must pursue his remedies. Lastly, courts should lbok at coun-
sel's actions. If Tenth Circuit courts adopt this approach, employees will 
find these courts more willing to consider the remedial purposes underly-
ing anti-discrimination laws and less willing to foreclose remedies to lay 
employees. 
B. The Acts and Omissions of Employers 
In most employment discrimination cases, the adverse employment 
action and knowledge of discrimination occur simultaneously. However, 
in some instances, such as was the case in Davis, knowledge of the dis-
crimination will not be evident until some later time. The rule pro-
nounced in Davis allows employers in such circumstances to conceal 
discriminatory pretext for adverse employment decisions and makes it 
more difficult for plaintiffs to find relief for employment discrimination 
within courts of the Tenth Circuit. 157 Davis held that regardless of the 
reason the employer advances for the employment action, "the employee 
still has a duty to determine whether there was a discriminatory motiva-
tion for the employment decision."158 The Davis court stated that even if 
154. /d. 
155. !d. at 1180 n.l. 
156. !d. at 1182. 
157. See Davis. 913 F. Supp. At 1442-43; but see Jones v. Hodel, 711 F.Supp. 1048 (D. Utah 
1989) (holding time period begins to run when facts that would support a claim of discrimination 
would have been apparent to similarly situated person with a reasonably prudent regard for his 
rights. The court in Jones stated that to toll the time limitation, the employer must have actively en-
gaged in some deception to prevent the employee from filing.) 
158. Davis v. Wesley Ret. Cmty.lnc., 913 F. Supp. 1437, 1443 (D. Kan. 1995). 
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the employer did terminate for discriminatory reasons, that reason need 
not be declared to the employee. 159 The core question as to when the time 
limitation starts to run was not "notice or knowledge of the discrimina-
tory motivation" but "knowledge of the adverse employment deci-
sion."160 
This rule places an impractical burden on the plaintiff. The plaintiff 
is charged with constructive notice of any discriminatory reason once an 
action is taken, even if the employee has no knowledge or supposition of 
discriminatory pretext at the time of the action. For many employees this 
will mean divining whether an employer has discriminated. Employees 
will learn of discriminatory acts from either other employees, which may 
or not be amiable towards the plaintiff, or from an employer who has al-
ready taken adverse employment action against the employee. This bur-
den would of course be placed on a claimant without the aid of the dis-
covery process. 
The Davis rule places more focus on employer protection and less 
emphasis on the purpose of remedial legislation like Title VII, the ADA, 
the ADEA, and the EPA,which is to end a history of egregious employ-
ment discrimination in this country. The impractical burden on the plain-
tiff effectively serves to promulgate employer discrimination and con-
cealment. The employer can then mislead the employee as to the true 
cause of the action and thus lull the employee into inaction. Despite this 
misrepresentation, the employee would have the duty of discovering the 
concealment placed on the employee. 
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit dealt with this issue in 
Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 161 where a female attorney 
filed a charge of gender discrimination against her former law firm. Ini-
tially, Sherry J. Oshiver applied for a position as an associate attorney 
with the firm. 162 The firm hired her on an hourly basis, stating that it did 
not have a salaried position available, but that if one opened up the firm 
would consider hiring her. 163 The firm soon terminated Oshiver, stating 
that the firm did not have sufficient work to employ her on an hourly ba-
sis.164 Oshiver applied for unemployment benefits months later. 165 At a 
benefits hearing, Oshiver discovered that the firm had hired a male attor-
ney to replace her shortly after her termination. 166 The lower court dis-
159. Jd. 
160. Jd. at 1443 (quoting Hulsey v. Kmart Inc., 43 F.3d 555,558-59 (lOth Cir. 1994)). 
161. 38 F.3d 1380 (3d Cir. 1994). 
162. Oshiver, 38 F.3d at 1383. 
163. !d. at 1384. 
164. Jd. 
165. Jd. 
166. Jd. 
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missed Oshiver's complaints for discriminatory refusal to hire and dis-
criminatory discharge as untimely and granted the firm's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 167 On appeal, the court reversed the Motion for 
Summary Judgment on the discriminatory discharge claim. 168 In Oshiver, 
the court stated a rule contrary to that espoused in Davis. The court held 
that the trigger date for the time limitation was not the date of the adverse 
employment action, but the date that "the plaintiff discovers that he or 
she has been injured."169 The court further explained that the date a claim 
accrues is the time from which the plaintiff knows or should have rea-
sonably known of the discriminatory action. 170 
The Oshiver court reasoned that it would be unjust to allow an em-
ployer/defendant to benefit from its own misleading acts or omissions. 171 
The time period should be tolled where the employer lulled the employee 
into inaction or misled the employee as to the reasons for the termina-
tion, thereby causing the plaintiff's untimely filing. 172 
Applying the Oshiver rule in courts within the Tenth Circuit would 
recognize the realities faced by an employee when attempting to obtain a 
remedy for discriminatory employment actions. It recognizes the core 
policy behind anti-discrimination legislation-the elimination of work-
place discrimination. The Oshiver rule provides greater incentive for an 
employer to not conceal discriminatory reasons for employment deci-
sions. By exposing a deceptive employer to possible claims in the future 
by employees who subsequently discover discriminatory pretext. Oshiver 
also places the burden of ensuring non-discrimination on the employer 
rather than the employee. If the Tenth Circuit applied a rule like that pro-
pounded in Oshiver, employees would be afforded greater protection 
from employers' discriminatory acts. 
C. Counting Employees 
There are four approaches courts may consider when computing the 
number of employees to determine coverage under a particular anti-
discrimination act. Three of those approaches are based on established 
case law and the fourth is based on core policy principles underlying fed-
eral anti-discrimination acts. Any of those approaches could be employed 
in the Tenth Circuit to allow for broader interpretations to fairly balance 
167. /d. at 1383. 
168. !d. 
169. !d. at 1385. 
170. !d. at 1386 (citing Ohemeng v. Delaware State Coli.. 643 F. Supp. 1575, 1580 (D. Del. 
1986)). 
171. /d. at 1387. 
172. See id. at 1389. 
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the treatment of employers and employees in employment discrimination 
cases. 
1. The public policy exception 
The majority's analysis in Exam Center focused primarily on Bur-
ton's state law claim as a UADA claim. 173 As a state law claim, the 
UADA provided the exclusive remedy for wrongful discharge. The ma-
jority then used the requirements and background of the UADA to guide 
its analysis. 174 The majority ultimately held that no public policy excep-
tion to the UADA allowing for a tort of wrongful discharge against an 
employer with fewer than fifteen employees should be adopted, espe-
cially where the legislature had expressly exempted small employers 
from coverage. 175 
The dissent suggested that instead of focusing primarily on the 
UADA as the exclusive remedy for age discrimination, the primary focus 
should be on the public policy exception framework presented by the 
Utah Supreme Court in Berube v. Fashion Center Limited. 176 The dissent 
suggested that clear public policy reasons existed for treating Burton's 
age discrimination claim, not as a strict UADA claim, but as a tort for 
wrongful discharge. 177 
In Berube, the Supreme Court of Utah reasoned that public policy 
exceptions should be implemented where there are interests "so substan-
tial and fundamental that there can be virtually no question as to their 
importance for promotion of the public good."178 The Durham dissent ar-
gued that an exception in this case would recognize that protection 
against employment discrimination was a substantial and fundamental 
right that promoted the public good of all workers in Utah. 179 The Dur-
ham dissent also cited other state court decisions, 180 arguing that the heart 
of the public policy exception was the rationale behind both state and 
federal anti-discrimination acts, noting the eradication of the "detrimen-
tal effects of employment discrimination on the public interest." 181 A 
173. Exam Center, 994 P.2d at 1263-64. 
174. !d. 
175. !d. at 1267. 
176. 771 P.2d 1033, 1042 (Utah 1989). 
177. See Exam Center, 994 P.2d at 1268-69. 
178. !d. (quoting Berube, 771 P.2d at 1042). 
179. !d. at 1269. 
180. !d. (citing Molesworth v. Brandon, 672 A.2d 608 (Md. 1996)). The dissent also cited 
other courts for the proposition that though there were small business exemptions, the small busi-
nesses were not exempt from the overall intent behind the state anti-discrimination acts. See id. at 
1270. 
181. !d. at 1270. 
261] EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 281 
public policy exception allowing for a tort of wrongful discharge in state 
courts within the Tenth Circuit would place greater focus on the remedial 
purposes of the anti-discrimination acts. This would allow all employees, 
including those of small employers, opportunity to seek redress for em-
ployment discrimination. 
However, a major concern with the dissent's proposition is the in-
creased liability a small employer would face with a tort of wrongful dis-
charge. Under the UADA, employers receive the benefits of notice re-
quirements, shorter time limitations, and an administrative process that 
attempts conciliation between the employer and employee. 182 In addition, 
a state administrative process, if successful, can be less costly than a pro-
tracted legal battle. A tort of wrongful discharge would doubly burden 
small employers by giving them none of the benefits of the UADA and 
exposing them to expensive legal fees when faced with a charge of dis-
crimination. 
A better approach would be to strictly limit the public policy excep-
tion and not allow a common law cause of action for all discrimination 
cases. The exception would apply only to the employee minimum, allow-
ing employers with less than the minimum number of employees re-
quired to be covered by the UADA. Allowing a claim of discrimination 
to proceed under the UADA would better balance the purpose of state 
acts like the UADA, while still providing the protection small employers 
need from the burden of employment discrimination litigation. 
2. The economic realities test 
Many courts have expanded the coverage of federal anti-
discrimination statutes by employing the "economic realities" test in de-
termining whether an employer meets the threshold requirement for the 
minimum number of employees. 183 Rather than looking at technical 
terms, such as "manufacturing representative," "volunteer," and even 
"independent contractor," these courts look to the economic realities of 
the relationship between the principal and the agent. 184 
In McClure v. Salvation Army, 185 the Fifth Circuit dealt with a gender 
discrimination claim brought by a female agent of The Salvation 
182. !d. at 1267. 
183. NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns. Inc., 322 U.S. Ill (1944); Christopher v. Stouder Mem'l. 
Hosp., 936 F.2d 870 (6th Cir. 1991); Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir. 1983); Neffv. 
Civil Air Patrol, 916 F. Supp. 710 (S.D. Ohio 1996). 
184. See McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 557 (5th Cir. 1972); Armbruster, 711 
F.2d at 1335. 
185. 460 F.2d at 554. 
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Army. 186 The court eventually held that McClure's claim could not be 
maintained because The Salvation Army was a religious organization 
and any regulation by the government would be an unconstitutional vio-
lation of the separation of church and state; however, the court, in prob-
ing the terms of the employment contract, determined that McClure was 
an "employee," despite that fact that her "employer" considered her a 
volunteer. 187 The court stated that semantics in terms of employment or 
in employment contracts should not "be used to waive protections 
granted to employees by an Act of Congress."188 Rather, the court held 
the main focus should be on the particular facts of each case and factors 
such as whether the agent was "selected, employed, controlled, trained, 
and paid" by the principal. 189 
A similar approach was taken by the Sixth Circuit in Armbruster v. 
Quinn. 190 The court dealt with sexual discrimination charges brought by 
two females against their employer. 191 The district court had dismissed 
their claims, holding that the employer did not meet the employee mini-
mum since their "manufacturing representatives" did not qualify as em-
ployees.192 On appeal, the court noted that particular labels an employer 
might ascribe to its agents were not determinative of whether they were 
covered under Title VII, but rather the "economic realities underlying the 
relationship between the individual and the so-called principa1."193 The 
court observed that the purpose of congressional acts like Title VII was 
to remedy harms to workers in general, and the term "employee" should 
be construed broadly in light of the individuals they were to protect. 194 
The court also observed that after Supreme Court decisions holding that 
independent contractors were covered under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act ("NLRA"), Congress specifically amended the NLRA to ex-
clude independent contractors. 195 This occurred before the passage of the 
Title VII. 196 The court further reasoned that Congress had failed to ex-
clude particular types of employees, like manufacturing representatives 
186. McClure, 460 F.2d at 455. 
187. ld. at 557. 
188. ld. 
189. Jd. 
190. 711 F.2d 1332, 1333-34 (6th Cir. 1983). 
191. See id. at 1334. 
192. Jd. 
193. !d. at 1340. 
194. !d. 
195. !d. at 1341. 
196. See id. 
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and independent contractors from coverage, further evincing an intention 
for a broad reading of the term "employee." 197 
In Hornick v. Borough of Duryea, 198a federal district court in Penn-
sylvania dealt with a sex discrimination charge filed by a temporary fe-
male employee of the borough police force. 199 The employers contended 
that the police force did not have the requisite number of employees to 
be considered an employer.200 Specifically, the issue was over two part-
time workers and ten Comprehensive Employment and Training Act 
workers?01 The borough argued that it did not fit under the Title VII 
definition of "employer," because it did not have the requisite number of 
employees?02 The Hornick court cited the opinions of other courts that 
had similarly dealt with the issues of part-time workers as employees and 
held that part-time workers did qualify as employees under Title VII.203 
The court also held that the Act was intended to cover not only part-time 
workers, but also seasonal workers.204 The broadened interpretations of 
the term "employee" in McClure and Hornick allow for protection of 
more workers exposed to unlawful employment practices. The focus 
should not be on the labels assigned agents or on technical readings of 
remedial acts, but on the true relationship between the principal and 
agent. This focus allows for an interpretation that would provide protec-
tion for all workers intended to be covered by the congressional acts. 
Such a focus in courts within the Tenth Circuit would also provide 
greater remedies for employees that suffer employment discrimination. 
3. The payroll method of counting 
Another definitional aspect of the term "employee" was addressed in 
Walters v. Metropolitan Educational Enterprises, Inc. 205 Several circuit 
courts were at odds as to the method for counting employees for the pur-
pose of determining whether a company qualifies for the small business 
exemption to Title VII and the ADEA. Some circuits used the counting 
method, in which salaried workers were counted "as employees for every 
day of the week they [were] on the payroll" and "hourly paid workers 
197. !d. 
198. 507 F. Supp. I 091 (M.D. Pa. 1980). 
199. !d. at 1093. 
200. !d. 
201. See Hornick, 507 F. Supp. at 1098. 
202. Title VII defines an "employer" as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce 
who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks 
in the current or preceding calendar year." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1990). 
203. Hornick, 507 F. Supp. at 1098. 
204. !d. at l 098. 
205. 519 U.S. 202 (1997). 
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[were] counted as employees only on days when they [were] actually at 
work and on days of paid leave."206 Other circuits used a payroll method 
that focused on "whether an employer has employment relationships 
with fifteen or more individuals for each working day in twenty or more 
weeks during the year in question."207 The United States Supreme Court 
resolved the split in Walters by holding that the payroll method was the 
correct way to count employees. 208 The Court reasoned that the payroll 
method "represents the fair reading of the statutory language" and em-
bodied "the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning" of "has an em-
ployee."209 Primary reliance on the phrase "for each working day" sug-
gests that the employee be actually at work on a certain day, and such a 
test was an improbable interpretation of remedial statutes like Title VII 
and the ADEA.210 
The Supreme Court, in choosing the broader interpretation embodied 
in the payroll method, recognized the remedial nature of acts like Title 
VII and the ADEA while not abandoning the legislative intent embodied 
in the Acts' requirements. This holding recognized that the Acts were 
meant to protect workers against unlawful discrimination, and that highly 
technical or superfluous interpretations had no place in interpreting anti-
discrimination statutes. Holdings of courts outside the Tenth Circuit have 
interpreted the requirements of anti-discrimination laws more broadly, 
thus increasing the coverage of both state and federal anti-discrimination 
acts. 
4. Abrogating or limiting the small employer exemption 
Significant policy factors exist for abrogating or limiting the em-
ployee minimum requirement within courts of the Tenth Circuit. The de-
termination that small employers should not be covered by acts like Title 
VII was a product of legislative compromise?" There was an effort to 
protect small businesses-like family owned agricultural and livestock 
operations, and small family owned enterprises, who would likely hire 
workers of their own ethnicity from the burdens imposed by legislative 
regulation.212 This same reasoning is the motivation behind many small 
employer exemptions at the state level.213 
206. Zimmerman v. North Am. Signal Co., 704 F.2d 347, 353 (7th Cir. I 983). 
207. Walters v. Metro. Educ. Ent., 519 U.S. 202,203 (1997). 
208. !d. 
209. !d. at 207. 
2 I 0. !d. at 203. 
21 I. See Armbruster, 711 F.2d at 1337 n.4.' 
212. See id. 
213. See e.g. Exam Center, 994 P.2d 1261. 
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The major policy principle behind the enactment of state and federal 
anti-discrimination acts was the eradication of employment discrimina-
tion in all levels of society. However, the small business exemption pre-
sent in federal and state acts turns a blind eye to discrimination by small 
businesses. The dissent in Exam Center stated that small employers made 
up nearly seventy percent of all Utah employers,214 leaving the majority 
of Utah workers open to the very discrimination the UADA sought to 
eliminate. Nationwide, similar policy reasons exist for exceptions, if not 
abrogation, of small employer exemptions in anti-discrimination legisla-
tion. In 1998 there were at least 8,047,650 workers employed by 
1,238,972 employers with nineteen employees or less.215 The United 
States Small Business Association estimates that twenty million small 
businesses produce thirty-nine percent of our nation's GNP.216 Thus the 
small business exemption ignores at least eight million workers em-
ployed by small businesses, which are growing in number and impor-
tance. As a practical matter, state and federal legislation have different 
protections for workers employed by small businesses and those em-
ployed by larger employers, which is essentially a double standard. As a 
policy matter, it sends a message that though elimination of workplace 
discrimination is important for some of the workforce, it is not important 
enough to cover the entire workforce. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Several courts within the Tenth Circuit, at both the state and federal 
level, are predictably employer friendly when interpreting the require-
ments of state and federal anti-discrimination legislation.217 The core pol-
icy factor behind the enactment of statutes like the EPA, Title VII, the 
ADEA, and the ADA, was to eliminate a national history of workplace 
discrimination based on race, gender, religion, national origin, disability, 
and age. Legislative enactments were aimed at providing relief to those 
that had historically been harmed by such discrimination. However, an 
unbalanced approach toward strict statutory interpretation tends to favor 
employers, often leaving employees without remedy. 
There are three areas where courts within the Tenth Circuit could 
214. !d. at 1269. 
215. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Statistics about Business Sizefrom the U.S. Census Bureau: Table 
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give broader interpretations to legislative requirements in order to give 
greater meaning to their remedial purpose. First, bright line rules con-
cerning attorney assistance at any point of the filing process should not 
be the focus when deciding whether to toll time limitations. Rather, the 
focus should be the due diligence of the claimant in filing claims, the 
claimant's good faith belief that such claims are well founded, whether 
the employer would be prejudiced by a late filing, the overall remedial 
purpose of the statutes, and consideration for the technical nature of the 
filing process in light of the fact that laymen usually initiate the process. 
Also, the circumstances surrounding a plaintiffs representation by coun-
sel should be considered, although they should not be the core factor, in 
deciding whether equitable tolling of the time limitations is appropriate. 
Second, courts within the Tenth Circuit should look at the acts and 
omissions of employers in making adverse employment decisions. Em-
ployers should not benefit from misrepresentation and concealment. 
Time limits should be tolled when employers proffer pretextual reasons 
for discriminatory decisions. Time limitation should trigger from the date 
the employee discovers or should have reasonably discovered the dis-
criminatory motivation. 
Finally, the term "employee" should be given a broad interpretation. 
Courts could implement public policy exceptions to state and federal 
employee minimum requirements, thus allowing for a balance between 
the eradication of employment discrimination and protection of small 
businesses. Also, courts could look at the economic realities of relation-
ships between principals and agents and not at technical or superfluous 
labels. The payroll method of counting should be broadly interpreted 
when counting employees. In addition, small employers should be held 
to the same standards as other employers and their employees offered the 
same protection afforded employees of larger employers even if there is 
an abrogation or limitation of the small employer exemption. By imple-
menting these three approaches, the remedial nature of anti-
discrimination acts will be greatly enhanced, and employees will be 
given a more evenhanded approach in employment discrimination suits 
in state and federal courts within the Tenth Circuit. 
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